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State-of-the-art quantum key distribution systems are
based on the BB84 protocol [1] and single photons gener-
ated by lasers. These implementations suffer from range
limitations [2] and security loopholes, which require ex-
pensive adaptation [3]. The use of polarization entan-
gled photon pairs [4–6] substantially alleviates the secu-
rity threads while allowing for basically arbitrary trans-
mission distances when embedded in quantum repeater
schemes [7–10]. Semiconductor quantum dots are capa-
ble of emitting highly entangled photon pairs [11] with
ultra-low multi-pair emission probability [12] even at
maximum brightness. Here we report on the first im-
plementation of the BBM92 protocol [5] using a quan-
tum dot source with an entanglement fidelity as high as
0.97(1). For a proof of principle, the key generation is
performed between two buildings, connected by a 350 m
long fiber, resulting in an average key rate of 135 bits/s
and a qubit error rate of 1.91 % over a time span of 13
hours, without resorting to time- or frequency-filtering
techniques. Our work demonstrates the viability of quan-
tum dots as light sources for entanglement-based quan-
tum key distribution and quantum networks. By embed-
ding them in state-of-the-art photonic structures, key gen-
eration rates in the Gbit/s range are at reach.
Successful quantum key distribution experiments with en-
tangled photons (EQKD) have been carried out [13, 14], uti-
lizing photon pairs generated via the spontaneous paramet-
ric down conversion (SPDC) process. However, for those
sources, the multi-photon-pair emission probability is directly
coupled to the source brightness by their Poissonian emission
characteristics. This circumstance limits the pair-extraction
efficiency for SPDC sources to about 0.01, as higher values
inevitably increase the average photon-pair number [15]. The
excess photons lead to spurious detector clicks during the key
generation in EQKD protocols, which results in key errors and
security loopholes [16]. Semiconductor quantum dots (QDs)
can generate polarization-entangled photon pairs [17–20] and
do not suffer from these limitations due to their sub-poissonian
photon-pair emission characteristics [17, 21]. GaAs quantum
dots obtained by droplet etching [22] can emit polarization
entangled photon pairs with a demonstrated multi-photon
emission probability as low as 8(2)×10−5 [12]. The weak
confinement of the multi-particle wave functions in these QDs
[23] in combination with their high in-plane symmetry result
in entanglement fidelity values as high as 0.97(1) (see below),
without resorting to time-filtering (as used in Ref. [24]) or
post-growth tuning [11]. The high fidelity values allow for a
low qubit error rate (QBER) and are therefore crucial for the
viability and the effective key rate of EKQD implementations
[5, 6, 25, 26]. Successful attempts of quantum teleportation
[27] and entanglement swapping with QDs [9, 10] further
encourage the development of QD-based quantum networks
for long-haul quantum communication [8].
The layout of our EQKD implementation is depicted in
Fig. 1(a). The first communication node (”Alice”) and the
GaAs QD-based photon source are situated in a laboratory
in the semiconductor physics building at the Johannes Ke-
pler University campus, while the second node (”Bob”) is
a mobile system placed on an office desk in the LIT Open
Innovation Center (OIC) and is connected to the source by a
350 m long single mode (SM) fiber. Entangled photon pairs
are distributed via fibers from the source to Alice and Bob. A
more detailed depiction of the setup is shown in Fig. 1(b). The
BBM92 protocol relies on analyzing the incoming photons in
the rectilinear (”+”) and diagonal (”×”) basis [5]. A perfectly
random choice of the measurement basis plays an essential
role for the security of the protocol. We exploit the natural
unpredictability of the path taken by a photon impinging on a
50:50 beam splitter (BS) to ensure this randomness. Different
techniques can be employed to reduce the number of detectors,
but at the cost of higher effort to ensure the randomness of
the basis and a higher vulnerability to side channel attacks
[13, 24]. Each detector after each of the two outputs of the
BS (the two possible bases) is assigned either a symbol ”0”
or ”1”. Alice and Bob perform the key sifting procedure by
exchanging only information about the measurement basis via
a standard 100 MBit/s LAN connection, leaving no informa-
tion for a potential eavesdropper on the public channel. Only
if the entangled photon pairs arriving at the detectors of Alice
and Bob are in the maximum entangled polarization state |φ+〉
with respect to the measurement basis, photons analyzed in
the same basis cause the same measurement outcome at both
sides and therefore identical key strings consisting of ”0” and
”1” symbols.
In order to generate entangled photon pairs, the QD is ini-
tialized into the biexciton state by a pulsed laser, using a two-
photon excitation scheme (TPE) [11], see inset of Fig. 1(c).
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Figure 1. (a) Configuration of the fiber-based EQKD system using highly entangled photons from a GaAs quantum dot (QD)
photon source. Alice is situated in the lab, together with the photon source. Bob is assembled in a movable box placed in the
LIT Open Innovation Center and connected to the photon source via a 350 m long single mode (SM) fiber. The photons are
analyzed in the rectilinear (”+”) and diagonal (”×”) basis, each outcome is assigned to a ”0” or a ”1” symbol. The key sifting,
as sketched in the table, is performed over a 100 MBit/s LAN connection. (b) Illustration of the optical and electronic
components of the setup. The GaAs QD light source is in a He flow cryostat and is resonantly excited by a pulsed laser with a
repetition rate of 80 MHz. A set of identical NFs reject laser stray light and distribute the entangled photons through FA and FB
to Alice and Bob. The PC corrects for any reversible polarization altering effects. Two identical four-state analysis setups at
Alice and Bob measure the photons in rectilinear and diagonal basis. The TTs are connected to standard computers and backed
by Rb clocks, acting as a 10 MHz frequency reference. A movable linear polarizer (P) and a shutter (S) are used for initial
clock synchronization. (c) Emission spectrum of the resonantly driven QD after rejecting the laser stray light by NFL and
selecting the X and XX lines by NFX and NFXX, respectively. The inset sketches the two-photon-excitation scheme (TPE),
with EP the laser photon energy, S the fine structure splitting, and EB the binding energy of the |XX〉 state. (d) Autocorrelation
of the X and XX signals, using a time bin of 1ns.
Figure 1(c) shows the spectra of the consecutively emitted
photons from the biexction-to-exciton (XX) and the exciton-
to-groundstate (X) radiative decay for a selected QD. As we
drive the XX state in a resonant process at saturation (at the
so-called ”pi pulse” condition), a pair emission occurs with a
probability of ε = 0.87(5) per pump pulse. Figure 1(d) shows
the autocorrelation histograms for the XX and X signals un-
der these pumping conditions after filtering the remaining
laser stray light. The resulting multi-photon emission prob-
abilities of g(2)X (0) = 0.017(2) and g
(2)
XX(0) = 0.025(2) are
predominantly governed by the APD dark counts and ambient
light. These values emphasize the excellent single-photon
purity of GaAs QDs in combination with the TPE scheme
and can be further improved by a better shielding against
stray light and by using detectors with lower dark counts [12].
For SPDC sources, in contrast, the multi-photon emission
probability is directly connected to the pair-emission prob-
ability by the Poissionian emission characteristics, so that
g(2)SPDC(0) = εSPDC [28]. Hence, efficient pumping and a high
single photon purity inherently exclude each other in the case
of SPDC sources.
The maximum excitation pump rate for QD sources is only
limited by the XX and X radiative lifetimes T1,XX and T1,X,
as no excitation can occur until the QD has relaxed into the
groundstate. For the here used photonic structures (T1,XX ≈
120ps and T1,X ≈ 270ps) a pump rate of about 600 MHz is
accessible (see supplementary for calculations). Reducing
the lifetimes further by Purcell enhancement [29] can readily
push this limit to the GHz regime.
One of the most important parameters affecting the fidelity to
the |φ+〉 state for QD sources is the so-called fine structure
splitting (FSS) between the two X eigenstates, which, for the
used QD, has a magnitude of S = 390(62)neV (A detailed
description the optical setup, TPE and the relation of the FSS
with the entanglement is given in the methods).
A practical realisation of EQKD requires distribution of
entanglement over noisy quantum channels, like the here used
single mode fibers. The goal is to distribute the entangled
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photon pairs while ensuring the highest possible fidelity to
the |φ+〉 Bell state. The first aspect to be considered in this
case is the synchronization between Alice and Bob. The
latter requires precise knowledge about the photon’s arrival
times at the nodes, which are possibly separated by large
distances and exposed to different environmental conditions.
Their hardware and internal clocks therefore inevitably oper-
ate dissimilarly. In the methods, we describe in detail how
we handle the timing and synchronization between Alice and
Bob with external Rb clocks, and also propose an alternative
without reference clocks. An important core feature of the
here used synchronization method is the irrelevance of the
employed hardware, the fiber length and the latency times, as
it relies solely on the strong polarization correlation between
the emitted XX and X photons.
The second aspect to be considered is the influence of
the fibers themselves on the entangled photons. The most
pronounced effect of single mode (SM) fibers on propagat-
ing light is a general damping of the signal, which is about
3 dB/km at a wavelength of 780nm. Besides damping, more
profound effects on entangled photons have to be taken in
account when distributed over fibers: polarization dependent
loss (PDL) [30] and polarization mode dispersion (PMD) [31].
PDL does not depend on the source’s coherence properties and
is less of an issue for modern fibers at length scales at which
damping becomes the dominating limiting factor anyway (at
about 200km for 1550 nm or 10km for 780 nm). PMD, on
the other hand, not only randomly (but reversibly) alters the
polarization state, but can lead to irreversible degradation of
the entanglement [31, 32]. Sources with a photon coherence
time T2 lower than the fibers’ differential group delay (DGD)
(typically around 0.5ps/
√
km) suffer substantially from PMD
and one has to resort to frequency filtering [33]. Although
strategies exist to preserve the entanglement through PMD-
and/or PDL-afflicted quantum channels [34], they require
precise knowledge about the effects and control about the po-
larization modes simultaneously, rendering them impractical
in the context of a real-world application due to the constantly
changing environment. In the case of QDs, the T2 time is
capped by T1,XX and T1,X, which are orders of magnitudes
higher than the DGD of SM fibers and therefore PMD has no
meaningful impact on the entanglement (see supplementary
for supporting calculations).
The complex rotation of the polarization state induced by
the fibers and the rest of the setup is reversible and can be
cancelled by a polarization controller (PC). As long as the
variation of the rotation (e.g. due to temperature fluctuations)
is slow compared to the measurement time, it can be elimi-
nated effectively during the whole key generation procedure
by readjusting the PC on demand, see methods. For testing
the capabilities of the PC and to probe the entanglement fi-
delity, preliminary experiments were performed, where Bob
was placed together with Alice in the lab and connected by a
700 m long fiber (350 m to the OIC and 350 m back to the lab).
After the PC, the fidelity to the |φ+〉 state, measured by a full
state tomography, was determined as f|φ+〉 = 0.97(1). Details
to the measurement, including the 2-qubit density matrix, are
given in the supplementary.
After the initial polarization correction, the setup is pre-
pared for continuous key generation. During this operation,
the software executed at Alice’s and Bob’s Notebooks per-
manently monitors the QBER by comparing a random and
subsequently discarded subset of the generated keys. The
random choice prevents a potential attacker from finding pre-
dictable time windows for eavesdropping without being de-
tected. During normal operation, only a small fraction of keys
has to be sacrificed for this purpose to achieve appropriate
accuracy and security. However, the target here was to record
the QBER with a high frequency and with high accuracy, so
we dedicated 10 % of the keys and excluded this fraction from
the key rate calculations. For the key generation, photons
within an arrival time bin of 1 ns are used, which includes all
photons from the QD, but excludes a reasonable amount of
background photons from ambient light. Figure 2(a) shows
the raw key rate with an average of 135bit/s over a time span
of 13 hours. The monitored QBER during the key generation
is shown in Fig. 2(b). The dashed lines indicate the maxi-
mum QBER of 11 % for the here employed BBM92 [5, 26]
and 7 % for the Device Independent (DI) [6] protocols, re-
spectively, below which it is still possible to distill secure
keys. The DI protocol protects against potential collective
attacks and includes an additional measurement basis at one
node, which can be readily implemented in the present sys-
tem. Without adjusting the PC during the measurement, we
observed a variation of the QBER between 1.84 % and 2.06 %
over the course of the measurement, probably stemming from
slight changes of the fiber’s environment, such as temperature
and vibrations. The resulting average raw QBER is 2.36 %.
The discrepancy between QBER of 1.1 % calculated from the
measured entanglement and the here measured minimum of
1.84 % is the result of several minor imperfections, which add
up to a significant degree (see methods for details). Compared
to preliminary tests with short fibers (2 m) in the lab we ob-
served no increase in average QBER, as expected due to the
negligible effect of PDL and PMD on the photons from QDs.
The fraction of ”1” symbols in the resulting key strings
is 0.513, which reveals a slight bias towards the ”1” symbol.
This discrepancy arises mostly from slight differences of the
efficiencies of the single photon detectors in the four-state
measurement arrangements. The resulting non-unity Shannon
entropy poses a minor potential security threat, but can be
corrected by inverting a random half of the bits for both keys
[6]. The finite QBER can be brought to zero during the act
of error correction by iterative parity exchange [13, 25] and
subsequent ”bit twiddling” [35], where both procedures leak a
negligible portion of information about the keys to the public
channel. Assuming an unknown measurement apparatus, one
always has to expect the initial finite QBER to stem from an
intercept-resend attack from an eavesdropper tampering with
the quantum channel [26]. The number of leaked determin-
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Figure 2. (a) Raw key rate and (b) QBER over a time span of 13 hours. The dashed lines indicate the upper limits of 11 % for
the BBM92 and 7 % for the Device Independent (DI) protocols. (c) Exemplary encryption (encr.) of a 29.2 kByte large bitmap
with Alice’s key using the one-time-pad method, with a subsequent decryption (decr.) with Bob’s key. The decrypted bitmaps
are shown for the cases (i) directly after key sifting and (ii,iii) after error correction and privacy amplification. The bar charts
indicate the distribution of information over Alice (A), Bob (B) and the eavesdropper (E) after each step.
istic bits - plus five standard deviations - can be estimated
[25] by l = 4Nq + 5
√
12Nq, where N is the length of the
key and q the QBER. In order to erase this information, a
”privacy amplification” technique [35] is applied: The key is
compressed to a maximum length of N− l by using a random
universal hash function on which Alice and Bob agree over
the public channel. Figure 2(c) depicts the encryption of a
bitmap using 29.2 kByte of Alice’s key (acquired in about
46 min), utilizing the information-theoretically secure one-
time-pad method. The latter is performed by applying the
bit-wise XOR operation of the original bitmap and Alice’s
key. The decryption is done by performing the same operation
with the encrypted message and Bob’s key. The bar charts
in (i-iii) depict the distribution of information about the key
among Alice (A), Bob(A) and a potential eavesdropper (E)
after key sifting, error correction and privacy amplification,
respectively. The latter decrease the net key rate depending
on the QBER (see supplementary for calculations), hence a
small QBER is desired for a high secure key rate. The average
key rate achieved here with the 350 m long fiber is 135 bits/s
before and 86 bits/s after correction with the initial QBER of
1.91 % and a final QBER of 0.
In conclusion, we have presented an implementation of the
BBM92 [5] quantum key distribution protocol using semi-
conductor quantum emitters as sources of highly entangled
photon pairs with an ultra-low multi-photon emission prob-
ability. With polarization entangled photons from droplet
etched GaAs quantum dots (QDs) [11] embedded in a sim-
ple planar cavity, a raw key rate of 135 bits/s and a QBER
of 1.91% have been achieved through a 350 m long optical
fiber without time filtering, resulting in a net secure key rate of
86 bits/s. These values allow for implementing protocols with
a higher demand on the QBER, like the device independent
scheme [6].
The long coherence time of photons emitted by QDs pre-
vents a degradation of the polarization entanglement when
transported via single mode fibers over practically relevant dis-
tances of hundreds of kilometers [31]. The general damping in
fibers, however, currently limits the transmission rates for the
wavelength used here (about 780 nm). Although free space
entanglement distribution at this wavelength was successfully
performed over a distance of 1120 km [14], utilizing the well
established fiber-based telecom infrastructure is desirable for
the targeted, highly interconnected quantum networks. To this
end, entangled photons in the telecom band (around 1550 nm)
could be obtained either by down-converting [36] photons
emitted by the GaAs QDs used here or by further developing
QDs based on different materials [37, 38].
To increase the source brightness, the QDs can be em-
bedded into circular Bragg resonators (CBR), which have
demonstrated pair extraction efficiencies over 0.6 [29] and
Purcell enhancements of up to 11 [39]. Using these struc-
tures, key rates of Gbit/s - well beyond the capabilities of
parametric-down-conversion sources - are at reach. Consid-
ering the simultaneously high photon indistinguishably [29],
QDs have the potential to act as nodes in much desired quan-
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tum networks [8, 9, 27].
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Methods
Sample growth and photonic structure
The GaAs QDs employed here were grown by the local droplet
etching method by molecular beam epitaxy. The QDs are embedded
in a 124 nm thick Al0.33Ga0.67As planar lambda-cavity, sandwiched
between two distributed Bragg reflectors (DBRs). The DBRs are
composed of 9 (bottom) and 2 (top) pairs of Al0.20Ga0.80As and
Al0.95Ga0.05As layers with 60 nm and 69nm thickness, respectively.
With an additional solid immersion lens (SIL) on top, this yields an
extraction efficiency of ηe ≈ 0.11.
Resonant two-photon excitation
The sample is placed in a He flow cryostat, cooled to T = 5K. Res-
onant two-photon excitation (TPE) is performed using wavelength
tunable laser pulses with a repetition rate of 80 MHz, a pulse-width
of about 10 ps and a pulse-energy of about 15 fJ (average pulse power
of 1.1µW), which are focused on a single QD. By a resonant two-
photon absorption process, almost each laser pulse excites the QD
to the biexciton state, leading to a photon pair emission probability
per laser pulse of 0.87(5). This value can be extracted from X/XX
cross-correlation measurements, as shown in the supplementary.
Photon collection and separation
The emitted XX and X photons collected by the objective (Obj
in Fig. 1(b)) pass a set of notch filters NFL with a bandwidth of
0.2 nm each, which reflect the largest part of the excitation laser
stray light. The NF’s central wavelength can be tuned from 780nm
to 786nm by adjusting their tilting angle. Two NFs of the same
type are individually tuned to reflect only the X (NFA) and XX
(NFB) photons, which are then coupled into the single mode fibers
FA (leading to Alice) and FB (leading to Bob). Depending on the
experiment, the length of FB can vary between 2 m and 700 m.
Four-state measurement
Alice and Bob both analyse their incoming photons by two nomi-
nally identical four-state measurement apparatus, which form the
core of the BBM92 arrangement. In each setup a 50:50 beamsplitter
(BS) is used to randomly select the measurement basis by directing
the photons in one of two arms of the setup. In the reflected path,
a Wollaston prism (W) is rotated such that one of its eigenaxis is
approximately parallel to the optical table plane, which we define
as the |H〉 polarization. As a consequence, the photons are mea-
sured in the rectilinear basis {|H〉 , |V 〉} by the following avalanche
photodiods (APDs) HA,B and VA,B, connected to a time tagger (TT),
which registers the detector clicks. As a side-effect of this partic-
ular arrangement the rectilinear basis forms an eigenbasis of the
polarization transformation caused by the BS reflection, which can
therefore safely be neglected in the following considerations (see
prove in supplementary). In the transmission path of the BS, the W
is rotated by 45° with respect to |H〉, so that the signal is measured
in the diagonal basis {|D〉 , |A〉} by the APDs DA,B and AA,B.
Spectroscopy and autocorrelation measurement
The spectra of the X and XX signals are analyzed by a standard
reflective diffraction spectrometer with a resolution of about 30µeV.
The fine structure splitting, despite being below the spectrometers
resolution, can be determined by polarization mapping (see supple-
mentary for details). The autocorrelation of the X or XX signal can
be obtained by combining the detector events from H,V and D,A, re-
spectively, in order to mimic a Hanbury Brown and Twiss setup. No
subtraction of the background is performed, which is predominantly
defined by the APD dark counts. The values of g(2)(0) are obtained
by calculating the peak area at zero time delay within a time bin of
1 ns and comparing it to the average side peak areas.
Polarization entangled two-photon state
The photon-pair’s polarization state is described by
|ψ(t)〉X,XX = 1√2
(
|H ′〉X |H ′〉XX + e−
i
} St |V ′〉X |V ′〉XX
)
,
where S is the magnitude of the FSS between the two possible
bright exciton eigenstates, t is the time the QD dwells in the ex-
citon state before decaying, and |H ′〉 and |V ′〉 are two orthogonal
linear polarization states, defined by the in-plane-symmetry of the
QD. The entangled state undergoes a time dependent phase evolu-
tion, determined by the product of S and t. As no time filtering
is employed the two-qubit density matrix is composed by all pos-
sible time dependent states weighted by their emission probabil-
ity: ρS =
∞∫
0
1
T1,X
e
− tT1,X |ψ(t)〉〈ψ(t)| dt, where T1,X is the exciton
lifetime. Non-perfect single photon-pair emission and background
from stray light and detector dark counts result in a non-unity sin-
gle photon purity κ = 1−1/2
(
g(2)X (0)+g
(2)
XX(0)
)
, generalizing the
equation to ρ = κ ρS +(1−κ) I(4)4 , with I(4) the 4×4 identity ma-
trix. The here used and most common quantity for evaluating the
similarity of a mixed state ρ to a pure state |φ+〉 is the fidelity
f|φ+〉(ρ) := Tr(ρ |φ+〉〈φ+|).
The weak confinement of the biexciton and exciton wavefunctions
within the GaAs QD result in short lifetimes of about T1,XX = 120ps
and T1,X = 250ps. The distribution of S over different QDs shows
values typically below 5µeV, i.e. QDs with S < 1µeV are straight-
forward to find. This leads to values of f|φ+〉 of over 0.95 without
resorting to strain tuning.
Timing and synchronization
The internal clocks of the time taggers (TT) are backed up by Rb
clocks, acting as a 10 MHz frequency standard. The detection time
delay between the X and XX photons can be found by exploiting the
strong polarization correlation between the entangled X and XX pho-
tons. Once determined, the time delay can be tracked continuously
during QKD operation without leaking information about the key on
the public channel. See supplementary for a detailed explanation.
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Polarization control
For cancelling the polarization altering effects induced by the fibers
in an optimal and efficient manner for the given purpose, an heuristic
approach was chosen: We assume the static transformations FˆA and
FˆB in the two-dimensional polarization space for the fibers FA and
FB, respectively. The entangled state undergoes the bi-local transfor-
mation to |ψ ′(t)〉= (FˆA⊗ FˆB) |ψ(t)〉. If the transformation is purely
governed by PMD, FˆA and FˆB are unitary and the following equation
holds (see supplementary for proof): |ψ ′(t)〉=
(
1ˆ⊗ FˆBFˆA†
)
|ψ(t)〉,
where 1ˆ is the unity operator. This implies that the combined trans-
formations of both fibers can be cancelled by inducing an additional
unitary transformation Uˆ anywhere along X or XX light path, so that
UˆFˆBFˆA
†
= FˆBFˆA
†Uˆ = 1ˆ. A polarization controller (PC in Fig. 1(b)),
consisting of three rotatable wave plates (two quarter wave plates
and one half wave plate) is capable of generating an arbitrary unitary
transformation Uˆ(θ ) ∈ SU(2) in the polarization space (see sup-
plementary for details), where θ = (θ1,θ2,θ3) represents the three
rotation angles. An optimum for θ is found by observing the correla-
tion between Alice’s and Bob’s detectors and minimizing the coin-
cidences in the orthogonal bases Oi ∈ {HAVB,VAHB,DAAB,AADB}
(later corresponding to key errors) while maximizing the coinci-
dences in the colinear bases Ci ∈ {HAHB,VAVB,DADB,AAAB} (later
corresponding to valid key entries), which is equivalent to minimiz-
ing the loss model function
L(θ ) :=
4
∑
i=1
〈Oi|ρ(θ )|Oi〉+
( 1
2 −〈Ci|ρ(θ )|Ci〉
)
, with ρ(θ ) the two-
photon density matrix for the rotation angles θ . A downhill-simplex
optimization algorithm is utilized for minimizing L in about 6 min-
utes in average when starting without initial guess. The qubit error
rate (QBER) is then given by q = 14
4
∑
i=1
〈Oi|ρ|Oi〉.
In the supplementary we provide data for an exemplary polarization
correction using an effective fiber length of 700 m.
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